Abstract Many applications of Operational Research in the context of health care involve processes of calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis. Indeed these processes seem to have such an elevated status that their absence is often regarded as a marker that a study is somehow substandard. Undoubtedly this may be the case, however there may also be circumstances where it is perfectly reasonable not to use such methods. This paper concerns general principles underlying mathematical modelling, particularly in contexts where data for calibration are either poor quality or non-existent. The discussion challenges the view that modelling should necessarily be subject to formulaic calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis processes in an attempt to achieve or establish 'accuracy'. Some models are used purely to deduce the logical consequences of a set of beliefs and in this context, the need for validation is at best questionable. If calibration and sensitivity analysis are to be carried out, there is a need to be clear about what the objective is in such analyses.
Introduction
This paper arose from a request to provide advice concerning what sensitivity analysis procedures to adopt for testing the forecasts of a model of cervical cancer screening, an area of modelling of which the author has experience [1] [2] [3] [4] . Having agreed to write some notes on this, it seemed appropriate to include a brief preamble discussing the question 'why do we do sensitivity analysis?'. This apparently simple question provoked a lot more thought than was expected, encompassing thoughts about calibration and model validity, which form the basis of the current paper. Given the nature of the paper, a written extract from a keynote address, the form is more discursive than usual for a journal article and perhaps almost polemic in tone, since the aim is to challenge what appear to be wide-spread notions which some seem to espouse with dogmatic zeal. Indeed the UK National Institute for Clinical Excellence insist on somewhat formulaic sensitivity analysis in relation to modelling [5] .
In this paper, no specific results are given. Instead, the discussion is based on relatively commonplace examples, including the modelling of cancer screening.
To be clear on terminology, throughout this paper, 'calibration' will be used to reflect the process whereby values are derived which are used as the parameters within a model. 'Sensitivity analysis' refers to the process of systematically changing the values of these parameters in order to assess the degree to which such changes affect the estimates produced using the model. 'Validation' is a process whereby one attempts to establish how faithfully a model's predictions accord with reality. There are many different ways in which each of these three activities can be carried out.
In common with many other health care modelling contexts, when evaluating cancer screening options mathematical modelling is based on deductive reasoning, using logical inference to estimate outcomes based on what is believed about the natural history of the disease. Even if the assumptions of the model are broadly correct, there are often data values required by the modeller which are not known and which will probably never be known. For example, cancer development is commonly modelled using compartmental modelling, assuming patients progress between different health states, and there is a need to estimate transition rates. However, it would be unethical to carry out studies to see how quickly early cancer or premalignancy develops into more serious invasive cancer if a patient is left untreated. In view of this, direct measurement of transition rates is infeasible. Unfortunately, the values used for such transition rates have a large impact on forecasts obtained using such a model. This is reminiscent of a situation the author once found himself in related to the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry-a cause célèbre which has had a major impact on health care within the UK. Some cardiac surgeons at Bristol had been suspended due to what was regarded as an abnormally high death rate amongst their paediatric cases. It became clear that when analysing their outcomes, it was important to take into account the types of cases they were dealing with since if they were dealing with a more complex case load than is typical, their patients would inevitably have a higher mortality than average. The problem that arose was that there was no easy way to estimate standardised mortality rates for different types of case since the only large scale data sources available did not concur. This has a similarity with the modelling of cancer screening since the same question arises with both-how can one judge whether a model is good or bad when basic information is unavailable. In the case of the Bristol analysis, the author suggested a somewhat unusual approach to analysis which stepped outside the paradigms of statistics [6] . The author argued that it was fruitless to try to obtain statistically sound estimates of the surgeons' performance. Instead one should adopt an analysis deliberately biased to show the Bristol outcomes in the best possible light and, even then, one would judge outcomes to be poor. Needless to say, deliberately biasing an analysis is not a common statistical technique, although consideration of lower and upper bounds is quite common within Operational Research.
It may be that a similar radical shift of paradigm is needed to address the issue of calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis in certain classes of health care models. There seems to be an aspiration to develop the most 'realistic' and 'truthful' model that can be achieved. But there are frequently circumstances where that is a futile goal and it is important to recognise this. It is fruitless, and possibly very misleading, to assume that modelling a process in great detail and carrying out extensive sensitivity analysis will confirm that what is modelled is an accurate reflection of reality.
Models should be accepted for what they are-imperfect. There are circumstances where a different form of thinking would seem to be sensible Rather than 'I have calibrated, validated and done sensitivity analysis therefore this model is accurate', we should perhaps be asking 'Given this model is wrong, how misleading is it likely to be?'.
2 What is the purpose of sensitivity analysis?
Instead of becoming involved in the technicalities of sensitivity analysis, it is worth considering the fundamental question of why it is carried out and what the aspirations are of those who do it. The notion that sensitivity analysis can be used to 'validate' a model can be challenged (although there may be circumstances where it can invalidate a model). Certainly if a model is judged to be valid, sensitivity analysis can be used to assess the variability of the forecasts made using the model and how this depends on the data values used to populate it. However, sensitivity analysis cannot, of itself, be used for assessing the accuracy of forecasts independently from other evidence concerning the model's validity. Nor, by the same token, can sensitivity analysis be used to assess the accuracy of a model, in the sense of how closely one might expect the model to replicate reality.
Undoubtedly there are circumstances where sensitivity analysis is useful, even when the validity of a model is questionable. Equally, there are circumstances where the use of a model known to be invalid is perfectly sensible. This is heartening, since models used in health care are frequently gross simplifications of a complex reality added to which, data used for calibration is often of dubious quality.
Discussion of the role of calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis strays into the realms of the philosophy of science and epistemology, the study of knowledge.
Inductive and deductive reasoning
The vast majority of health care related research is based on what is known in the philosophy of science as inductive scientific method. This is a process whereby inference is based on data gathering and the application of statistical methods, such as hypothesis testing or the derivation of confidence intervals. This is epitomised by the randomised controlled trial, regarded by most involved in health care research (but not the author) as the gold standard method by which new knowledge is acquired.
It is somewhat ironic that the tenets of inductive method form such a major part of health care training since, in practice, much of what clinicians do is to make decisions based on deduction, which is a dual scientific method. Whereas induction is based on making many observations and then inferring a general principle, deduction is based on using a set of general principles and using logical inference to derive new knowledge, insights or to improve decision making.
Given the knowledge that the heart pumps blood around the body through the arterial system to supply oxygen to vital organs, even the most junior surgeon can infer that, when using scalpel, it is unwise to cut through a major artery without a very good reason for so doing. This inference is not based on a randomised trial. It is a logical deduction and such deductive processes guide much of clinical decision making.
Unfortunately, given the ubiquity of inductive methods in health research, the paradigms of such science tend to be so ingrained that it can seem heresy not to apply them. When presenting the results of a modelling exercise, one can sense the unease at the lack of p-values and confidence intervals. However, since deduction is a different scientific method, there are circumstances where the perceived necessity for sensitivity analysis and validation is questionable, even nonsensical. Confidence intervals and hypothesis testing are from the land of inductive reasoning, so why should it be viewed as a necessity to have such constructs when dealing with deductive models?
The acknowledged imperfection of all mathematical modelling
Mathematical modelling is an extension of such deductive processes adding formalism and applying specialist analysis methods to improve the quality of decision making.
Consider three examples where mathematical modelling can assist or improve decision making:
-A clinician wishes to determine a dosage schedule for a patient in order to bring the plasma concentration of a particular drug into a safe therapeutic range; -A doctor glances at a map to find the quickest way to get to the house where he has to make an emergency home visit at 11 o'clock at night; -Health experts wish to know whether to recommend that the National Health Service should change the ages at which cancer screening is offered.
In each case, the decision being made would be difficult to make based on carrying out an empirical trial. Instead, some form of deductive analysis can be carried out to guide the decision, although sometimes the decision maker might be unaware of this. Also, it is possible to apply formal mathematical modelling to the decision problem. This entails an implicit or explicit process of estimation to determine data and/or parameter values required in the modelling.
The three vignettes share several common features, not least that the present author has carried out research on all three topics. For each, it is possible to perform mathematical analysis at different levels of complexity dependent on what simplifying assumptions are made. The first case concerns an area of modelling known as pharmacokinetics the principles of which are similar to reaction kinetics, as studied in chemistry. Such modelling is widely used, extensively validated and non-controversial.
The second case is less familiar to a clinical readership, but is introduced since it can be used to illustrate several issues associated with modelling. At one level, it illustrates that deductive reasoning and mathematical modelling can be done without even being aware of it. For example, the doctor might glance at the map and imagine a straight line between his starting point and the destination. Using the mathematical fact that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, the general practitioner (GP) might then chose a route through the road network that visually approximates this straight line.
The third example concerns modelling of cancer management and there have been several variants of such modelling, particularly in the case of cancer screening. The fact that there are several different ways of modelling the same process is quite a common phenomenon, which some health care researchers find odd. It is a fallacy to believe that if one is clever enough and works hard enough then eventually the perfect model will be discovered to represent a particular system or process. When teaching Operational Research to mathematics students, one of the difficult challenges is to get students to understand that there isn't a platonic ideal model-the perfect answer in the back of the book as it were. There are many ways of modelling, all of which may give different answers. Students have to get used to not seeking a model that is perfect and instead learn to search for a model that is adequate. Usually this involves a process of repeated modification and refinement producing a sequence of models.
To illustrate this, consider the case of the GP wishing to find the quickest route from A to B. The first 'model' was based on approximate the straight line joining A to B as close as possible. At a more complex level the GP could use this route as an initial guess and then consider potential adjustments to the route, inserting detours that would give a shorter route. This could be used as the basis of an iterative algorithm to generate a route that can't be bettered in terms of distance travelled. There are many ways that such an algorithm could be structured and many other features that may be taken into account.
Numerous papers have been written in transport research related to this seemingly innocuous problem discussing many different mathematical models. Whatever the merits of different types of model, it is important to realise that there are many feasible models and, dependent on the data used to populate them, they are all likely to give a different answer to the question 'what is the quickest way to get from A to B?'. This raises a fundamental issue-if all the models give different answers, how can one judge which is best? In itself, this makes dogma about probabilistic sensitivity analysis something of a nonsense. Why be so concerned with sensitivity to changing parameter values while not concerned with the effects of changing the inherent structure of the model?
It is useful to recall a quote from an eminent statistician, George Box who once remarked 'All models are wrong, some are useful'. The GP choosing a route that approximates the best straight line to attend an emergency call may not get a publication in a transport journal, but he may well have made the most sensible decision.
Does sensitivity analysis reflect validity?
Given that different modelling methods may be used with different levels of complexity, is there a role for sensitivity analysis in guiding the degree of faith that one should place in the predictions of a model? Consider the GP route choice problem again. It is a relatively simple matter to compile a data set that describes the connectivity of a road network, the length of each road link and to estimate the distance that would be travelled for a given route through the network. If one is willing to assume a constant average speed, a computer algorithm could in principle be used to estimate the journey times for different routes between A and B in order to identify the route judged to be quickest. This would constitute a mathematical model.
Ignoring the merits of such a model for the present, what can sensitivity analysis tell us? The length of road links are relatively easy to measure with accuracy and it might be reasonable to assume that there are negligible measurement errors associated with such data. Estimating mean average speed is more problematic. However, for this particular model, no matter what value is assumed for the average speed, the same route will be judged to be the quickest. Thus extreme sensitivity analysis, for example assuming many different assumptions about average speeds in the range 2 to 100 km/h, would always result in the same route being recommended. One could even assume a probability distribution for what the average speed is and carry out probabilistic sensitivity analysis, again the same route would be identified as quickest for each.
Such excellent performance of the model, in terms of sensitivity analysis, does not imply that the model is valid. The model does not reflect known empirical facts about road travel. For example, if the recommended quickest route is also the route that passes through most traffic signals, then the assumption that it will be traversed at the average speed for the network is dubious. Omission of a key factor in the analysis, the important role of traffic signal delay in determining journey speed, makes the model invalid, in the sense that its use may result in a very suboptimal route being chosen.
Sometimes sensitivity analysis can establish invalidity
Queueing theory is very useful in many clinical contexts [7] . Queueing theory gives a useful set of tools for the analysis of the consequences of the unpredictable nature of hospital admissions, and length of stay, say.
Typical behaviour of steady state queuing models is that measures such as mean waiting time or waiting list size increase as traffic intensity increases, with a singularity as traffic intensity approaches 1. This is a fundamental finding from queueing theory and illustrates the folly of planning health care resources to match average demand.
Fundamental as such queueing theory is, sensitivity analysis can be used to show that there are circumstances where such models are a poor representation of reality. The predictions from queueing theory for high values of traffic intensity can be unrealistic. Varying traffic intensity in a range between 0.989 and 0.999 typically gives mean waiting list sizes that simply cannot be the case-there are not sufficient patients to constitute such a waiting list. Indeed if values for traffic intensity are used that exceed 1, by however little, then queuing formulae have negative values, which is even more absurd.
Thus sensitivity analysis can establish that the models are invalid, although they are actually very useful and still plays a fundamental role in contributing to systems thinking about health care. This raises a telling philosophical issue. The quest for 'validity' in a model may sometimes be misplaced. Models that are invalid, in some sense, can still be useful. Indeed it could be argued that validity is sometimes an inappropriate yardstick for assessing a model.
To what extent do deductive models need to be validated?
Applying mathematical modelling to health care research complements trial-based methodologies, using a radically different method of inquiry. Where trialists generally strive to remove the effects of preconceptions, modellers adopt the reverse position-'if this is what is believed then what are the consequences?' Modellers thus depend on deductive rather than inductive reasoning. Of course, caution is needed since deductions based on false assumptions or unsound beliefs may be misleading.
The examples discussed in this paper show that it is perfectly possible to apply deductive modelling to investigate health care topics. But what about the issue of whether such modelling should necessarily involve validation exercises.
The author would claim that it should not be regarded as a necessity and that in many cases validation of a deductive model is largely an irrelevance. Validation is quite rightly a major issue for inductive science, but not so for deductive logic. Certainly the deductive modeller has a duty to ensure that the laws of logic are obeyed but what exactly does validation mean beyond this? In any case what degree of validation is required before a deductive model is valuable? The GP estimating an approximately straight line path to drive to an emergency call-out has certainly used a flawed method and a traffic engineer could probably do better, however as regards making a decision quickly, the method is useful. Yet it is difficult to imagine how one would carry out a validation exercise or indeed to justify why it should be done.
In the case of models based on deduction, the knee-jerk reaction view that all models should be 'validated' does not make sense. Yet in the author's experience, this is quite a common view.
A specific example concerns modelling in relation to genetic screening [8] for a condition called haemoglobinopathy. Here, the modelling process was entirely deductive. The modelling team was told by their collaborating experts that the laws of Mendelian genetics are an accepted truth, that some ethnic groups have substantial risk of carrying recessive genes associated with haemoglobinopathy and the modelling concerned estimating quantities such as the numbers of cases where pregnant women would be detected as carrying a recessive gene, how many fathers would also carry that gene and thus how many fetuses would have both. While some of the fine detail may have been imprecise, such as the exact gene prevalence in higher risk groups, the assumptions themselves did not seem to be in question. So what does validation mean in this context? This model was not developed to establish new scientific principles, instead the aim was to use scientific principles that are accepted to infer logical consequences that might be useful to planners. Although the paper used a high proportion of the Greek alphabet, the analysis was purely deductive. Why would one expect such a model to be validated? Yet this was a criticism levelled at the work.
Is validation of a deductive model a valid process?
Clearly, in the case of the haemoglobinopathy model, if an imprecise prevalence estimate is used, the forecast of the model may not accord with what is measured. This does not make the model invalid. Using the wrong estimate of the mass of the Sun and thus predicting the wrong orbit for the Earth does not invalidate the inverse square law.
Equally is possible to have a model that is based on an assumption that is wrong that forecasts the right result. For example, a model based on the assumption that the gender of a child depends whether it was conceived at an even or odd minute of the hour would clearly be dotty, yet it forecasts the proportion of males and females reasonably well. However it would be difficult, although perhaps fun, to prove that such a model is invalid.
Using the forecasts of a model and comparing them against what is observed is thus not always a credible means by which the validity of a model can be assessed. This difficulty is exacerbated if a model is designed not to make precise forecasts, but to give conservative lower bounds for the effects of a change in operation. In this case, since the forecast is known to be inaccurate (and stated to be so), it is questionable to compare it with actuality to confirm validity. If a model is used and predicts that screening would reduce cancer deaths by at least 10% and a trial shows that the actual reduction is 50%, does that make the model valid or invalid?
This is not to say that it is a bad idea to check a model by comparing forecasts with actuality, but often all this can achieve is to deny the validity of a model rather than to confirm it. A model based on the notion that the gender of a child will be male if the minute of conception is divisible by N is silly, but it could only be shown to be invalid so long as N is different from 2. This is an example of the theory of Karl Popper [9] that one can establish empirically that a theory is invalid, but never prove a theory valid. Although that said, nobody has ever shown that Popper was correct.
The alternative to empirical testing is to examine the validity of the assumptions and scientific principles upon which a model is based. Yet is this the preserve of the modeller? That is inductive science. Many modellers simply do not have the skills of the experimentalist or the trialist and it makes little sense for modellers to be expected to do this. Yet surely this does not invalidate the role of the modeller any more than Einstein should be lampooned since he wasn't an experimentalist.
Deductive modelling is part of a multidisciplinary process. Modellers rely on experts in the field being studied to tell them the current state of knowledge in terms of what is believed. Working with these experts, modellers then have the responsibility of identifying useful questions to investigate and, with due diligence, to make inferences based upon what is believed and derive new knowledge that follows as a logical consequence. So long as the laws of logic are followed correctly, this process is valid. Whether or not the resulting model correctly predicts what can be measured does not invalidate the deductive process although it may quite rightly cast doubt on the assumptions or the parameters being used in the model.
Discussion
In this paper, the notions of calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis have been discussed hopefully providing some rationale to dispel the myth that these processes are always a necessary part of any modelling exercise. This is not to say that these processes have are valueless, but one needs to give careful thought to precisely what the purpose of a modelling exercise is before making a rational decision about the extent to which they are required.
If it is decided that sensitivity analysis is a requirement, it may take several forms depending upon what the purpose is. In some contexts the notion of deriving worst case estimates for the benefits that may follow from a particular change in the operation of a system may well be all that can reasonably be expected and it can be very informative to accept that a model is wrong and then to examine how misleading it is likely to be.
Conclusions
The examples discussed in this paper are used to argue against formulaic calibration, validation and sensitivity analysis as being necessities in relation to modelling. This perhaps leaves a void and some might feel uneasy about this-if we don't have these rules for judging the soundness of a model, what should they be replaced with? The author would prefer to pose a different question. Why should one expect mathematical modelling to be bound by rules concerning how it should be done?
A telling analogy concerns the Bourbaki movement. Nicolas Bourbaki is the collective pseudonym under which a group of pure mathematicians wrote a series of books with the goal of founding all of mathematics on formal logic and set theory. This rather doctrinaire and somewhat pedantic approach to mathematics has fortunately largely fallen out of favour. This was partly because it was a dull way of doing Mathematics (the books contained virtually no diagrams, for example), but also because too many important advances, such as combinatorics or algorithm design, didn't fit into the rigid paradigms of the Bourbaki movement.
This perhaps is the basis for the ideas of the current paper, a plea for the abandonment of notions that mathematical modelling should be governed by formulaic rules dictating how it should be done. Whatever, rules are suggested for how modelling should be done, it is probable that a useful model can be created that doesn't conform to them.
